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Preferred Capital Structures and the Question
of Filing
Paul M. Shupack*
INTRODUCTION
This Article started from a moment of cognitive dissonance
that occurred last academic year. First I read a proposal by then
Professor, now Dean, Douglas Baird that recommended bringing
the law of secured transactions into line with law and economics
scholarship. According to Dean Baird, the law ought to be
changed so that it "facilitates the creation of strictly hierarchical
capital structures."1 His suggestion followed from Professor
Alan Schwartz's similar recommendation that this change would
bring the law into alignment with the actual preferences of credi-
tors and debtors. 2 Then I read a passage in a draft of Revised
Article 8 that last appeared as part of Comment 10 to Revised
UCC section 9-115. In relevant part that passage read:
It is quite common for securities firms to prearrange agreement to
pledge financing facilities with many different banks, and, when such
financing is needed, to obtain it from several different banks, using dif-
ferent collateral for each. This is a rather different financing pattern
from the usual inventory financing arrangement for merchants and
* Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. My
thanks to Carl Bjerre, William Bratton, David Carlson, Howard Ruda, and
Barry Zaretsky, whose critiques of earlier drafts of this paper have added to its
virtues. The remaining vices are entirely my own.
1. The quoted passage appeared in an early manuscript version of a paper
Dean Baird prepared for the symposium Revision ofArticle 9 held at the Univer-
sity of Virginia Law School, October 15-16, 1993. The published version of this
paper, Douglas G. Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered, 80 VA. L. REv. 2249
(1994), does not contain this passage. Instead, it concludes that "strictly hierar-
chical capital structures are not self-evidently desirable." Id. at 2259. Dean
Baird defines strictly hierarchical capital structures as those in which "a single
creditor will have a security interest in all the assets of a firm and other credi-
tors will all take a position that is junior to this single creditor's position." Id. at
2258.
2. Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STun. 209, 216-
18, 240-41 (1989).
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manufacturers of goods, who typically have working capital financing
arrangements with a single lender.3
These two views of creditor behavior do not easily coexist.
One way of reconciling them would be to declare the securities
industry sui generis. Yet that way of eliminating this tension
struck me as depending on assertions about the structure of the
economy for which the evidence is not altogether clear. Nor is it
altogether clear that the evidence could be forthcoming.
If Dean Baird is right, then Article 9 does not facilitate the
creation of strictly hierarchical capital structures. Firms without
strictly hierarchical capital structures thus would result from re-
sponses to current law rather than creditor and debtor prefer-
ences concerning capital structures. To justify the existence of
the Article 9 filing system, data must reflect the existence of
firms with non-strictly hierarchical capital structures, and a the-
ory needs to support the conclusion that the empirical data do
not simply reflect behavior produced by existing law.
I. THE CASE AGAINST FILING
The case against filing reduces itself to two basic points: fil-
ing is unnecessary and filing is mischievous. The debate con-
cerning preferred capital structures directly relates to the
objection that filing is unnecessary. Simply put, filing provides
only that information already known to those for whom filing is
relevant. If debtors have strictly hierarchical capital structures,
then the information filing provides is unnecessary to the top
creditor in the hierarchy. In addition, debtors will have adequate
incentives to reveal their capital structures to other interested
parties.4 The duplication of effort that filing imposes causes un-
necessary direct costs on debtors and creditors.
3. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, UNIFOIM COMMERCIAL CODE, REVISED ARTI.
CLE 8. INVESTMENT SECURIIES (WITH AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 9. SECURED
TRANSACTIONS) 156 (Proposed Final Draft 1994). This passage does not appear
in the 1994 Official Text with Comments of Revised Article 8 propounded by the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws.
4. As stated by Schwartz:
The key question is whether good borrowers can make credible commu-
nications of their debt status at acceptable cost.
There are several reasons to believe that these credible communi-
cations would be made. Initially, it is cheap to disclose debt status ....
In sum, though a financer would have no reason to know of all prior
credit transactions to which a potential borrower is party, it would
learn of any transaction of sufficient magnitude as to affect materially
the likelihood that its loan will be repaid.
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 220-21.
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The vision of the world that makes filing unnecessary is
grounded in well-established principles of modern financial eco-
nomics-agency costs.5 This theory asks us to believe only that
each actor will pursue its self-interest. Applied to relationships
between debtors and creditors, this principle tells us that debtors
will take advantage of opportunities to speculate with other peo-
ple's money. A debtor will attempt to obtain loans, claiming that
the loans represent a low level of risk. After obtaining loans
bearing an interest rate commensurate with a low level of risk,
the debtor will substitute projects with a higher risk than those
contemplated by the lender. If the riskier projects pay off, then
5. This part of finance economics builds on the work of Modigliani and
Miller:
Simply put, the Modigliani-Miller position is based on the idea that no
matter how you divide up the capital structure of a firm among debt,
equity, and other claims, there is a conservation of investment value.
That is, because the total investment value of a corporation depends on
its underlying profitability and risk, it is invariant with respect to rela-
tive changes in the firm's financial capitalization.
JAMEs C. VAN HoRNE, FiNANcIAL MANAGEMENT AND PouIcy 273 (9th ed. 1992)
(footnote omitted).
The Modigliani-Miller ("M-M) theory depends on heroic assumptions. Once
M-M became part of the fabric of financial economics, the work of financial eco-
nomics became to identify those places in which the imperfections in any actual
market permit an enterprise to increase its worth by its capital structure.
A more detailed overview of the post-M-M literature can be found in
Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, The Theory of Capital Structure, 46 J. FIN. 297
(1991), which identifies four "categories of determinants of capital structure."
Id. at 299. These four categories are:
1) The agency cost explanation. Mixing debt and equity ameliorates
conflicts of interest among various groups with claims to the firm's
resources.
2) The asymmetric information approach. Mixes of debt and equity
mitigate information asymmetries between management and the capi-
tal markets by conveying information and mitigating inefficiencies in
the firm's investment decisions.
3) Product markets. Mixes of debt and equity influence the nature of
the products the firm produces and the nature of product market
competition.
4) Corporate control contests. Mixes of debt and equity influence the
outcome of control contests by affecting the distribution of votes and
distribution of cash flows.
Id. at 300-25.
One recent practitioner-oriented book summarized the literature this way:
Although the proposition [the M-M theory] itself is of extreme impor-
tance to an academic, the impact of the M&M proposition to a practi-
tioner is most evident when it is inverted:
If financial policies matter, that is, if risk management policies are go-
ing to have an impact on the value of the firm.
Then it must be that the financial policies impact taxes or transaction
costs or the firm's investment policies.
CLIFFORD W. SMITH JR. ET AL., MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 362-63 (1990).
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the debtor will be better off-by a lot-and the creditor will be no
better off than if the debtor had invested in the original project
and earned enough to pay the debt.
Of course, riskier substitute projects have a greater risk of
failing and place the debtor's equity at greater risk. Yet, there
exists a range of projects with moderately greater risks in which
the debtor's expected value for riskier projects exceeds the ex-
pected value to the debtor for the original proposal. The debtor
will reap the exclusive benefit of this increase in expected value.
Under these circumstances, a rational self-interested debtor will
pursue its own well-being and undertake the riskier project that
results in a lower expected profit for the joint enterprise consist-
ing of both the debtor and its creditors. The joint enterprise,
however, does not concern any debtor who can increase the
probability of total gain for its part of the joint enterprise. 6
Debtor project substitution will increase the risk of non-pay-
ment, but creditors will receive no corresponding compensation
for the increased risk either by means of a higher interest rate or
by some type of participation in the up-side potential.
Creditors, of course, will not idly permit debtors to take ad-
vantage of them in this way. Creditors will attempt to minimize
the injury debtors can cause them by requiring elaborate cove-
nants in the loan agreement to prevent the debtor from engaging
in activities riskier than those contemplated at the time of the
original loan.7 Substantial evidence supports the financial the-
ory account of creditor and debtor behavior. Take, for example,
the conclusion of one study comparing publicly held loans with
relatively weak covenants to privately placed loans with restric-
tive covenants:
The protection provided by covenants affords private market investors
greater flexibility in assessing credit strength than that enjoyed by the
rating agencies in evaluating public market securities. Without such
protection, the agencies' ratings are necessarily skewed toward a pater-
nalistic and consistently conservative view ... . Many times, then,
what may appear to be unduly conservative credit ratings by the major
6. See Hedeki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80
VA. L. REv. 2103, 2106-11 (1994) (debtor's gain comes at a cost to its creditor and
to society).
7. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 221 ("The ubiquitous presence of elabo-
rate covenant protection suggests that those who obtain it plausibly believe that
they are initial creditors."); see also Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Se-
cured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. Rav. 901, 922 (1986) ("[L]oan covenants in term
loans typically forbid the debtor from either incurring additional debt or issuing
dividends without permission, and place restrictions on future investment pol-
icy, mergers, and similar activity.").
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rating agencies are explained by concern over future acquisitions or
other management policies that might materially and quickly alter a
company's risk profile. Sophisticated investors, by contrast, can and do
reduce the risk of dramatic changes in credit quality through the use of
financial covenants.8
The creditor has a substantial incentive to monitor the
debtor and to see that the debtor abides by the covenants. This
dominant creditor will actively monitor to ensure compliance
with the covenants and has little use for the information that a
filing system provides because the creditor has already acquired
that information. Debtors and creditors will benefit from a capi-
tal structure containing a single dominant creditor because a sin-
gle dominant creditor reduces agency costs that otherwise would
result from the presence of multiple creditors. Yet, to the extent
that the filing system facilitates the creation of creditors with
superpriority over an otherwise dominant creditor, then the fil-
ing system operates to prevent the creation of dominant
creditors. 9
The other branch of the case against filing is that filing can
be mischievous. Mischief results because anyone can err and
current law punishes missteps with draconian force. 10 The usual
result of a filing error is the loss of all contracted-for and relied-
upon priority rights in bankruptcy. The mischief that can result
with the current filing system would suggest an equally draco-
nian solution-abolish filing entirely. To the best of my knowl-
edge, no one has seriously proposed abolishing filing solely to
control the capacity it has to cause mischief. Instead, we have
James White's proposal that filing errors should not count in pri-
ority battles between secured parties and lien creditors, although
filing would continue to matter in battles between and among
secured creditors.1" Professor White's argument makes us recog-
nize a cost to secured creditors inherent in the existing statutory
arrangements. His solution preserves the benefits of filing for se-
cured parties, but does not address the question of whether these
benefits are illusory. This latter claim occupies this Article.
8. Dennis Emerick & William White, The Case for Private Placements:
How Sophisticated Investors Add Value to Corporate Debt Issuers, J. APPLMED
CoRP. FIN., Fall 1992, at 83, 87.
9. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 247 ("The optimal loan priority contract
will prohibit the debtor from incurring nontrivial later debt except for routine
trade credit and purchase-money loans up to specified amounts.").
10. See, e.g., James J. White, Revising Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litiga-
tion, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 823, 829-30 (1993).
11. Id. at 823-34.
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The arguments concerning the disutility of filing ought to be
taken seriously, but as of now they have not affected the pro-
posed revisions to Article 9.12 The revised Article 9 should not
include filing simply by force of inertia. Instead, some reason
should justify filing. If filing does make sense, then the case for
filing depends on a description of capital structures in which
debtors and creditors would prefer, if left alone by the law, not to
form strictly hierarchical capital structures.
I. THE CASE FOR FILING
This Article does not challenge the claim that for a large part
of the American credit market, the story told by agency theory
has significant support from the available evidence. Under no
circumstances does this Article contend that the standard ac-
count is wrong. This Article claims instead that agency theory is
incomplete. The account drawn from agency theory, concluding
with hierarchical creditor structures backed by loan covenants,
tells only one strand of a more complex story.
My moment of cognitive dissonance now requires that I ad-
dress three types of questions: 1) what empirical data exist con-
cerning debtors with non-strictly hierarchical capital structures,
2) what benefits does a filing system provide to these transac-
tions, and 3) can a theoretical framework supplement without
contradiction the standard account from finance theory and ex-
plain why some debtors and creditors would prefer a non-strictly
hierarchical capital structure? Thus, the questions to be ad-
dressed are: do these creditors and debtors exist, does filing
serve a useful purpose for these debtors and creditors, and why is
it that these debtors and creditors exist?
A. EMPImCAL EVIDENCE OF NON-STRICTLY HIERARCHICAL
CAPrrAL STRUCTURES
Some creditors lend relying on assets rather than on a
debtor's general capacity to pay. Examples of these types of cred-
itors are part of our common experience. A bank considering
making a home mortgage to an individual or a car dealer making
a car purchase loan will want adequate assurance that the prop-
erty offered as security has value at least equal to the loan, and
that it is not already subject to claims of others. In the commer-
12. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
PEB STuDY GRoup, UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9: REPORT 8 & n.22
(1992). [hereinafter PEB REPORT]
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cial context, available evidence, although thin, suggests that
these creditors who rely on assets exist, and exist in relatively
large numbers. One study estimates that approximately thirty-
four percent of commercial credit and industrial lending fits more
nearly the story of creditors relying primarily on assets than the
agency-cost account, with creditors engaging in due diligence and
demanding heavily covenanted loan agreements. 13
Loans between the very largest financial institutions and
their substantial debtors and loans between small debtors and
financial institutions illustrate complexities inconsistent with
the finance theory account. The evidence most directly relevant
to the issue of filing arises from the loans between small debtors
and the financial institutions that service them. This evidence
suggests that at least some creditors and debtors do not seek, nor
do they want, a single dominant creditor. Instead, the creditors
of these debtors look to the collateral, rather than to the debtor,
for reassurance that they will be paid. In these instances, the
collateral dominates the creditor-debtor relationship.
Yet it would be too easy, and also wrong, to say that these
asset-based lenders look only to the collateral. An asset-based
lender has to be concerned about the debtor's honesty, and, to the
extent that the collateral could unreasonably depreciate by rea-
son of debtor abuse, the asset-based lender must monitor some
aspects of the debtor's behavior. Moreover, these lenders would,
all other things being equal, prefer repayment to availing them-
selves of their creditors' rights.
Asset-based lenders are not indifferent to the industry-spe-
cific nature of collateral. If the collateral is specialized to an in-
dustry, for example oil drilling equipment, then the asset-based
lender has to be concerned with the reason that a debtor sud-
denly gives hints of repayment problems. 14 Repayment problems
that result from a fundamental problem existing in the debtor's
industry, rather than circumstances peculiar to the specific
debtor, will cause collateral specialized to the industry to lose
value at the time the asset-based lender will look to it for its se-
curity. This point, of course, is not limited to tangible collateral.
Receivables generated by credit sales to a particular industry can
slump both in amount and value if that industry or trade has its
difficulties.
13. Michael D. Sherman, Survey of Asset-Based and Other Competitive
Lending Activities, SECURED LENDER, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 18, 18. Professor Sher-
man's estimate is for 1992. Id.
14. Baird, supra note 1, at 2251.
1995] 793
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
These points, however, do no more than constitute a caution-
ary footnote. At issue is the question of the appropriate adverb:
do asset-based lenders "significantly" or "primarily" rely on the
assets against which they lend? Regardless of the adverb, these
asset-based lenders certainly do not fit the model of creditors
who rely solely, primarily, or significantly on the debtor's cash
flow. Asset-based lenders do not have the same incentives as
dominant creditors to know the capital structure of their lenders
and will not engage in extensive due diligence with respect to
their debtors. Without this sort of due diligence, the sorts of in-
formation concerning other creditor relationships to the debtor
will remain unknown to this creditor. If the creditor's concern is
significantly or primarily the asset, then a means by which the
creditor can learn about specific assets will have obvious infor-
mational efficiency compared to a system requiring all creditors
to know everything about every debtor. This sort of creditor will
not reward its debtor for having a strictly hierarchical capital
structure. Instead, this sort of creditor prefers a capital struc-
ture consisting of many little peaks. The creditor wants only to
be the king of its own little mountain.
Professor Sherman's survey of the members of the Commer-
cial Finance Association ("CFA"), who, in 1993, had $102 billion
in loans outstanding, 15 constitutes the bulk of available empiri-
cal information concerning the asset-based lending segment of
credit markets.' 6 In 1993 the CFA consisted of 232 members, of
15. CoMMERCIL FINANCE ASSOCIATION, 1993 MARMIG SURVEY FOR THE
ASSET-BASED FINANcIAL SERVICES INDusTRY tbl. 1 (1993).
16. See Sherman, supra note 13, at 18. The Commercial Finance Associa-
tion is an organization that describes itself as "the trade group for commercial
finance companies, factors, banks, and other financing agencies engaged in the
asset-based financial services industry on an international, national, regional
and local basis." This definition is printed on the title page of The Secured
Lender.
The text, by relying on Professor Sherman's survey, in all probability under-
states substantially the amount of asset-based lending that occurs in this coun-
try. No one can doubt that equipment leasing represents an alternative to
purchasing that same asset using secured credit. The Equipment Leasing Asso-
ciation estimated that in 1993 its members constituted a $125 billion industry.
Judy Temes, Leasing's Advantages Offset Interest Burden, CRAIN's N.Y. Bus.,
Apr. 11, 1994, at 24, 24. The Federal Reserve does not distinguish between se-
cured and unsecured loans made by domestic finance companies. It reports,
however, that these finance companies had outstanding $310 billion in business
loans at the end of 1993. FED. RESERVE BULL., Sept. 1994, at A36, tbl. 1.52.
These numbers suggest that the CFA data report only a fraction of the relevant
material.
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whom fewer than half were commercial banks. 17 The member-
ship "spans the spectrum of secured lending: purchased accounts
receivables, secured, fully monitored collateral loans, balanced
cash flow/collateral loans, 'business value' loans, and partially se-
cured, partially 'air ball' acquisition loans."1 8 Although the CFA
statistics cannot serve as a perfect surrogate for asset-based
lending with this mixture of activity, the primary focus of the
member organizations, whether banks or independent financers,
remains asset-based lending.
The lending patterns of banks doing asset-based lending and
finance companies doing similar work remain somewhat dis-
tinct.19 Professor Sherman describes the contrasting lending
patterns of commercial banks and commercial finance compa-
nies. For banks, the "fundamental basis for their lending is the
creditworthiness of such borrowers and, though declining in im-
portance, their long-term banking relationship with them."20
Conversely, Sherman notes that
finance company relationships with borrowers are much more tran-
sient, their lending much more short-term, and their willingness to lend
based much less on the character of their customers and much more on
their ability to liquidate their position at a profit and on short notice.
More traditional commercial lenders require that a firm borrow a fixed
amount and then repay the loan over a relatively long period of time.
This often creates a mismatch between borrower assets and liabilities;
more difficult monitoring problems; the need for extensive and self-de-
feating covenant protection; and greater lender risk exposure due to the
underlying long-term uncertainty of loan repayment and asset liquida-
tion value.
2 1
Sherman's survey reports that nearly fifty-six percent of the
commercial finance companies in the survey stated that their
borrowers came to them after being turned down by commercial
banks.2 2 These borrowers generally could not obtain unsecured
17. David H. Pendley, CFA Convention Keynote Address, SECURED LENDER,
Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 40, 40.
18. Id. at 42.
19. "Due to their historical preference for relationship and cash flow lend-
ing, many banks directed their new ABL units away from collateral only, toward
more dependence upon the cash flow aspects of a credit." Id.
20. Sherman, supra note 13, at 18.
21. Id. at 20.
22. Id. at 28. This account of why debtors give security provides yet another
solution to the puzzle of secured transactions. The question goes back to the
pioneering work of Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:
A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL SvUD. 1 (1981). Starting from Modi-
gliani-Miller assumptions, Schwartz showed that a debtor would not necessarily
improve its position by issuing secured debt. Any improvement in position re-
sulting from issuing secured debt could be lost by the increased cost of un-
1995]
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credit on any terms in the financial markets. As a result, con-
trary to the standard assumption that secured lending will be at
lower interest rates than unsecured lending, these customers
borrow at somewhat higher interest rates on their loans, usually
1.5-4 percentage points higher than commercial bank rates.23
These customers are predominantly manufacturing and whole-
sale businesses, 24 and principally borrow from these lenders to
finance accounts receivable, inventory purchases, and lines of
credit.25 These lenders "prefer shorter term, collateralized
loans"26 and borrowers understand that their lenders believe
that the "loans are designed to be self-liquidating, and at the first
hint of repayment problems, commercial finance companies will
enforce liquidation of their position."27
Professor Sherman's view of the relationship between credi-
tors, debtors, and collateral differs sharply with Robert Scott's
1986 description of relational lending.28 Scott described the as-
set-based financing market as
dominated by a few national finance companies, large commercial
banks with national coverage and an increasing number of regional
banks .... What remains after the integration of the private financing
industry, therefore, are lenders holding a financial portfolio of both un-
secured and secured loans premised on the existence of an inverse rela-
tionship between a borrower's balance sheet strength and the benefits
of collateral control.29
These lenders do not rely principally on recovery of the collateral
upon default and "frequently note that they are not content to
realize on defaulted loans by foreclosure proceedings even where
repayment is assured."3 0
secured debt. For a history of this idea in the law reviews see Paul M. Shupack,
Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. Rav. 1067 (1989).
See also David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L.
Rav. 2179, 2198-212 (1994).
The fact that over half of those who borrow on a secured basis from finance
companies have been turned down by banks offers a simple solution to the puz-
zle of secured transactions. For these debtors, the risk that offering security for
a loan will raise the cost of its unsecured debt is irrelevant, as these companies
are unable to obtain unsecured debt on any terms being offered in financial
markets.
23. Sherman, supra note 13, at 20.
24. Id. at 21 tbl. 3.
25. Id. at 27 tbl. 5.
26. Id. at 34.
27. Id. at 20.
28. Scott, supra note 7.
29. Id. at 943-44.
30. Id. at 944.
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The difference between Sherman's and Scott's descriptions of
asset-based lending is partially explained by the increased pres-
ence of commercial finance companies in the asset-based lending
market from the beginning of the 1980s .to the beginning of the
1990s. Before 1986, commercial banks constituted seventy-two
percent of the CFA membership. By 1993, however, fewer than
half of the CFA's members were commercial banks.31 Dean Scott
assumed that the partial integration of commercial banking with
asset-based lending observed in 1986 would continue and used
the description of commercial banking practices as the appropri-
ate model to describe the asset-based lending industry. What
Dean Scott saw as an incoming tide of commercial banks into the
asset-based lending market was instead its high-water mark.
The president of the CFA confirmed the sea change that oc-
curred in the latter half of the 1980s. He reported that banks
largely withdrew from the market for business loans under $1
million.32 During the late 1980s, banks acquired some of the
"larger independents [i.e., commercial finance companies],"
which resulted in displacing "key personnel of these independ-
ents," many of whom left because of "professional incompatibility
with the more regulated environment" within which they now
were forced to act.33 By the late 1980s, there existed "a void in
the market and the availability of experienced asset-based lend-
ers with strong entrepreneurial organizational experience."3 4
Explosive growth of independent commercial finance companies
quickly filled this gap. Although banks "still dominate the mar-
ket in total assets employed in asset-based credits,"35 they have
tended to maintain their "historical preference for relationship
and cash flow lending."3 6 These banks directed their new ABL
units away from collateral only, and "toward more dependence
upon the cash flow aspects of a credit."37 Recent CFA member-
ship patterns provide substantial reasons to believe that during
this past decade, a diminution, rather than an increase, in the
relative importance of bank-like lending practices in the asset-
based lending market has occurred.
31. Pendley, supra note 17, at 40.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 42.
37. Id.
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B. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF BENEFITS A FILING SYSTEM
PROVIDES TO DEBTORS AND CREDITORS
Filing serves a useful, and possibly a necessary, function for
the asset-based lending industry by reducing the cost of acquir-
ing information. The debtor's capacity to give collateral is a ma-
jor inducement for the creditor to make the loan. Because these
lenders look to assets, they have substantial concern about their
ability to assert unambiguous claims to the assets upon which
they relied when they made their loans. I therefore agree with
Peter Alces when he emphasizes the claim-staking purposes un-
derlying security arrangements. 38 Nonetheless, I believe that
the information-providing function of filing matters more to lend-
ers than his account would suggest. Because asset-based lenders
do not make the sort of examination of the debtor that could be
described as due diligence, the information produced from filings
does not duplicate information already known by these lenders.
1. Tangible Collateral
A lender against either tangible or intangible assets gener-
ally cannot claim rights to the collateral superior to those of the
debtor, and thus the creditor takes, the debtor's interest subject
to that claim. 39 If the collateral consists of goods, one risk is that
the debtor acquired collateral with impaired title. As to that
risk, inherent in any business enterprise, filing has little rele-
vance. Secured parties seeking protection against the debtor's
impaired title generally must rely on the rights given to bona fide
purchasers for value outside of Article 9.40 Similarly, filing can-
not help to solve title problems arising out of the debtor's acquisi-
tion of intangible collateral. 4
1
38. See Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MMN. L. REv.
679, 680 (1995) ("Claim-staking lies at the heart of the filing system's
rationale.").
39. But see Donald P. Board, The Scope of Article 9 Is Only One Quarter as
Great as Is Commonly Supposed, 47 U. Mixu L. REV. 951, 953-60 (1993) (argu-
ing that the common reading of UCC § 9-201 requires giving priority to all se-
curity interests unless some provision of the Code protects those interests from
the later-created security interest).
40. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1990) (rights of a good-faith purchaser for
value from one having only voidable title); id. § 2-702 (rights of a good-faith pur-
chaser for value against the original owner); id. § 3-205 (rights of a holder in due
course); id. § 4-210 (security interests arising out of the collection process); id.
§ 7-502 (rights of a person to whom a document of title has been duly
negotiated).
41. These risks include the debtor fraudulently creating the appearance of
having accounts receivable, or having non-fraudulently created accounts worth
[Vol. 79:787
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For a creditor lending against tangible collateral, especially
goods, filing provides protection against competing transferees of
the debtor. Article 9 protects a lender who has filed against col-
lateral from claims by a competing transferee who is out of the
ordinary course.42 Filing here can serve as its own justifica-
tion-we could say that the out-of-the-ordinary-course buyer
should have checked the public records and thus caused its own
injury. This justification, however, does not, in principle, depend
on filing because a legal system without a public record of secur-
ity interests could nonetheless preserve a secured party's inter-
est in property sold out of the ordinary course. A legal system
that preserved the secured party's interests, but did not require
public notice of that interest, would increase the costs of such
dispositions because the purchaser would not have an easy
method of discovering the impaired state of the seller's title. In-
sofar as filing constitutes a cheap and easy means of obtaining
this type of information, filing reduces the search costs of a
would-be purchaser who wants to confirm the title of an out of
the ordinary course seller. Filing has the effect here of increas-
ing the resale value of the debtor's goods and thus provides mod-
est gains resulting from informational efficiencies.
2. Intangible Collateral
When the collateral consists of intangible assets, especially
accounts receivable, filing offers distinct advantages over other
forms of conveying information concerning the collateral. Trans-
fers of interests in intangible assets have a shorter history than
transfers of interests in tangible property, but a strong need to
provide these transactions with stable law existed at the time of
the writing of Article 9.43 The Article 9 filing system now has the
effect of a title registration system for the sale of accounts, pro-
tecting buyers from the risk that either a prior-in-time or a sub-
sequent-in-time transferee with superior rights to the property
might come into existence.44 As intangible property continues to
what they appear to be because the account debtors can assert their UCC § 9-
318(1) defenses against the creditor relying on those accounts.
42. U.C.C. § 9-301.
43. See 1 GRANT GrLMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 8.6
(1965) (discussing subsequent accounts-receivable statutes).
44. One problem with accounts was their relative immaturity as a species of
property. By the time of adoption of the UCC, the majority rule was that an
owner of an account would by sale divest itself of its capacity to sell again that
which it had already sold. Under that rule the second purchaser acquired only
whatever interest the seller had (usually none) in the sold account. There was,
however, a minority rule, under which a second-in-time buyer would acquire
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become an increasingly important part of commercial activity,
the benefit, if any, resulting from filed interests with respect to
intangibles will increase rather than decrease.
Some evidence exists to support the conclusion that transfer-
ees of debtors prefer the search ease that a filing system creates
for sales of accounts to the effort otherwise required. That evi-
dence comes from the current debates concerning whether a re-
vised Article 9 should apply to sales of general intangibles for
money due or to become due. Article 9 presently defines accounts
as streams of payments arising from the sale of goods or services.
Selling the rights to a stream of payments has, in the past dec-
ade, become a commercially important means by which owners
liquidate those rights through asset securitization transac-
tions.45 In the common form of these transaciions, the originator
transfers its rights through a transaction that bankruptcy law
regards as a "true sale."46 The payment streams that are the
subject of these asset securitization deals include accounts, but
also may include rights to payments not presently covered by the
UCC, such as franchise fees or intellectual property license fees.
Because these payment streams do not arise from the sale of
goods or services, they are excluded from the scope of Article 9.
4 7
Excluding these payment streams from Article 9 has created
uncertainty for the asset securitization industry because a spe-
cific transaction may not unambiguously fall on one side of the
boundary. To solve the boundary issue, Article 9 could either not
apply to the sale of accounts or, conversely, could include the sale
of general intangibles for the payment of money due or to become
due. In response to this perceived need of the emerging asset
securitization industry, the UCC Article 9 Study Committee rec-
ommended that Article 9 apply to the sale of general intangibles
for the payment of money due or to become due.48 At no point in
rights superior to those of the first buyer. A third rule, under which the relative
priority of rights of two competing purchasers would be decided by the order of
notification received by the account debtor, also existed. See 2 id. §§ 25.6-.7.
45. The Public Securities Association reports that in 1993, $60 billion worth
of securitized assets were sold in public capital markets. As recently as 1985,
that number was approximately $1 billion. The total of private and public sales
of these new forms of asset-backed securities in 1993 was in the neighborhood of
$130 billion. Information available from the Public Securities Association, 40
Broad Street, New York, NY, 10004-2373.
46. If bankruptcy law recognizes the transfer of the asset to be a "true sale,"
then the asset may not be reached in a reorganization of the originator.
47. Article 9 is limited to the sale of accounts, U.C.O. § 9-102 (1990), and
accounts are defined to include only rights to payments arising out of sales of
goods or services. Id. § 9-102.
48. PEB REPORT, supra note 12, at 43 (Recommendation A.1.A).
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the discussions did anyone, whether from the asset securitization
side or from the more traditional financing side, suggest resolv-
ing the boundary issue by removing the sale of accounts from Ar-
ticle 9. As the Drafting Committee wrestles with text to
implement this recommendation, the ABA Task Force on Asset
Securitization has urged that the Drafting Committee give
weight to the title-affirming characteristics of the Article 9 filing
system as it chooses among various ways to implement the Study
Committee's recommendations. 49
This brief examination of the informational benefits that fil-
ing provides to transactions with tangible and intangible collat-
eral is necessarily inconclusive. Although some benefits result
from filing, these benefits, though important for some parties and
for some types of assets, are not vital to the structure of the mar-
ket for credit. If filing were abolished, those transactions that
filing eases would, in all probability, continue to occur in modi-
fied and more expensive forms. In calculating the benefits of fil-
ing, the following two circumstances in which filing is relevant
also should be considered.
3. Purchase Money Security Interests
Purchase money security interests ("PMSIs") and their
superpriority under current Article 9 represent a special case of
asset-based lending. Whether it is "good"50 that the law allows
second-in-time creditors to have rights to specific assets prior to
those of first-in-time creditors is not clear.51 Moreover, filing is
49. See Memorandum from the Securitized Asset Financing Task Force to
Article 9 Drafters 1 (Sept. 13, 1994) (on fie with author).
50. The term here is used in the sense elaborated by Walter C. Seller and
Robert J. Yeatman in their book 1066 AND ALL THAT: A MEMORABLE HISTORY OF
ENGLAND (1931), which asserts that England's history includes, among other
things, "one hundred and three good things."
51. This is not the place to enter into an extended discussion of the merits of
a legal system barring special priority for PMSIs. The articles are numerous
and the debate has not ended. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority
Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1395 (1989) (PMSI superpriority cannot be justified
on efficiency grounds); David Gray Carlson, Purchase Money Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 29 IDAHo L. REv. 793, 852 (1993) (advocating that the priority
mess be cleaned up); Kanda & Levmore, supra note 6, at 2114 (discussing the
advantages and disadvantages of late-in-time priorities); Schwartz, supra note
2, at 260 (treating the choice of order of distribution as an optimal contracting
problem); Paul M. Shupack, Defending Purchase Money Security Interests Under
Article 9 of the UCC from Professor Buckley, 22 IND. L. REv. 777, 788 (1989) (the
existing order can be rationally defended). It is easy to show that PMSIs can
harm prior-in-time creditors. See Paul M. Shupack, Defining Purchase Money
Collateral, 29 IDAHo L. REv. 767, 773-74 (1993). It is also easy to show that
PMSIs do not necessarily harm prior-in-time creditors. Take the case of a debtor
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not necessary to this type of asset-based lending. A legal system
could permit arrangements equivalent to PMSIs without having
a filing system. A seller of goods could, as part of the contract of
sale, reserve title in the goods until fully paid. Using property
law, Germany has a legal regime that enforces title retention by
sellers against third parties, in particular creditors of the buyer.
The German regime also has enough flexibility to give financing
banks benefits equivalent to those given to title-retaining
sellers.52
Using property law to create the equivalent of PMSIs is, of
course, achieved at some cost. At a minimum, the crude protec-
tion of section 9-312(3), which protects first-in-time lenders that
rely on inventory as collateral from suffering a degradation of
their positions by the debtor's subsequent inventory purchases,
cannot occur under a system in which no notice is possible.53
Without notice, the first-in-time creditor will risk significant
risk-altering behavior by the debtor without the capacity to de-
fend its interest, except by extremely close monitoring. The law
could free the first-in-time creditor from any need to monitor the
debtor by giving the first-in-time creditor priority rights in any of
the debtor's property over any later creditor. In this scenario,
who owes its only creditor ("C") a fixed sum and who has run through all assets
available on default. If that debtor were to propose a project that was both risky
and risk-altering-e.g., the purchase of a lottery ticket whose payoff would ex-
ceed the amount the debtor owed C-and if that debtor found a creditor willing
to finance this venture by taking a PMSI in the lottery ticket for the price of the
ticket, C would heartily approve. Under these circumstances C would have
nothing to lose, as there is nothing left to lose, and a possibility of sharing in the
gain, however remote.
This simple example differs not in kind, but in degree, from cases involving
a debtor who has creditors, is underwater financially, and has no assets avail-
able on default. In that case, short of some circumstance occurring that would
subject the existing creditors to lender liability claims, nothing the debtor can do
by contracting to create PMSIs will injure the existing creditors, whether se-
cured or unsecured. More complex examples could be analyzed. These would
show differing circumstances in which PMSIs can (but do not necessarily) bene-
fit prior-in-time creditors. Thus, the question of whether PMSIs do on balance
help prior-in-time creditors remains open as an empirical matter.
52. Conversation with Bernhard Schlink, Professor of Public Law and Phi-
losophy of Law, Humboldt University, Berlin, and Justice of the Constitutional
Court of the State of Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany (Oct. 1993).
53. The need for notice could also be eliminated by a legal regime that
would enforce a first-in-time creditor dominant position against any later-in-
time contract entered into by the debtor. This type of solution, which creates
property interests in favor of the first-in-time creditor regardless of the contract
terms between the later-in-time creditors and their common debtor, would, of
course, eliminate the possibility of a later-in-time seller being able to both sell
goods and reserve title to them.
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any creditor fearing that it might be second-in-time and right
would need to examine the debtor's affairs thoroughly to ascer-
tain that no prior creditors exist with trumping rights. The fact
that these creditors then will know what filing would reveal, is,
of course, exactly why Alan Schwartz proposed abolishing
filing.54
A statutory change to abolish filing would, in effect, abolish
asset-based lending. The existence of a large asset-based lending
industry, however, suggests that this sort of statutory change
would result in substantial transition costs. Of course, the exist-
ence of the industry does not prove its value. Before addressing
that question directly, there is a need to consider one more cir-
cumstance-one in which the absence of filing matters.
4. Information Provided to Trade Creditors From an Absence
of Filing
There is one corner of the commercial world in which the ac-
tors, at first glance, do improbable things. Debtors, typically
merchants or manufacturers in an inventory-intensive business,
refuse to permit security interests to be created against their in-
ventory. 55 Although a debtor may have a secured creditor with
perfected interests in accounts receivable and other personal
property, the debtor will not permit inventory to be the subject of
a filed security interest.56 These debtors receive unsecuied trade
credit from inventory suppliers, who, the debtor believes, will cut
off a debtor instantly if the debtor permitted a filing against its
inventory.
Thirty years after the widespread adoption of Article 9, one
might expect that all inventory suppliers, not just floor plan-
ners, 57 would file against their common debtor using the PMSI
54. See supra note 2.
55. I have been told this story by several separate sources, so I have to be-
lieve that it occurs with some frequency.
56. This creditor indifference to security interests in assets other than in-
ventory can be quite reasonable. The enterprises that are these sorts of debtors
will typically be selling the inventory that is or results from the trade creditor
supplied goods, i.e., "pooled" inventory. To the extent other collateral is equip-
ment or fixtures, these will in all probability increase the chances of the trade
creditors' goods turning over. As sales are the expected end product, to the ex-
tent that the debtor borrows against the receivables, these creditors will see the
receivable loan as a cash anticipation loan. All it does is accelerate the debtor's
having cash as a consequence of the sale, and these creditors expect to be paid
with that cash.
57. See 1 GILMoRx, supra note 43, § 4.3. The term "floor planner" originally
was given to finance companies that financed automobile dealers on a secured
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superpriority to keep their several interests distinct.58 With se-
curity interests in pooled inventory, if the debtor is a manufac-
turer, to the extent that the goods supplied have lost their
identity by becoming part of the debtor's end product, UCC sec-
tion 9-315 provides for pro-rata sharing-i.e., the same result as
in a bankruptcy proceeding.59 Suppliers would gain another
benefit from having perfected security interests in pooled inven-
tory. They would not have to worry about non-consensual claim-
ants.60 Yet, the reports persist. Trade creditors continue to
insist on keeping "pooled" (as distinct from floor-planned) inven-
tory free from security interests.
Howard Ruda6 ' has offered an explanation for this persis-
tent pattern of pooled inventory trade creditors neither taking
inventory security interests nor permitting their common debtor
basis. These finance companies received a security interest in the cars on the
dealer's showroom and the proceeds of the sale. Wholesale automobile financing
thus became known as "floor planning," but that term now applies to secured
financing of almost any sort of inventory. See, e.g., E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL LAw 769 (1993).
58. Whether PMSIs can be used to keep several secured interests distinct is
currently open to question. The holding of Southtrust Bank v. Borg-Warner Ac-
ceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1985) (inclusion of an after-acquired
property clause and a future advances clause in security agreements converted
secured creditor's PMSI into an ordinary security interest), has unfortunate con-
sequences for any secured party who depends on PMSI superpriority and who is
engaged in ongoing transactions with the same debtor. So long as that decision
is good law those creditors who rely on the trade pattern discussed here rather
than their PMSI superpriority may well have the last laugh. The consequences
of Southtrust have been widely discussed. See D. Benjamin Beard, The Purchase
Money Security Interest in Inventory: If It Does Not Float, It Must Be Dead!, 57
TENN. L. REV. 437, 480-84 (1990); Robert M. Lloyd, Refinancing Purchase Money
Security Interests, 53 TENN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1985); Shupack, Defining Purchase
Money Collateral, supra note 51; Mark B. Wessman, Purchase Money Inventory
Financing: The Case for Limited Cross-Collateralization, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283
(1990). The Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Study Group recommended
amending Article 9 to overrule Southtrust. PEB REPORT, supra note 12, at 97-
101.
59. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 726, 11 U.S.C.
§ 726 (1988); U.C.C. § 9-315 (1990). However, foreclosing upon commingled or
processed goods is difficult, and the value attributable to a specific vendor's com-
ponents is highly problematic.
60. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV.
1887, 1963 (1994) (arguing that subordination of involuntary creditors is wrong
as a matter of social policy). In practice, however, a Chapter 11 filing in bank-
ruptcy almost always precedes, and precludes, effective enforcement of lien
claims. Under current law, a PMSI is effective where a reclamation or judgment
lien right is not.
61. Howard Ruda is of counsel for the New York firm of Hahn & Hessen,
and is the editor of the four-volume work AssEr BASED FINANCING: A TRANSAC-
TIONAL GUIDE (1993).
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to grant security interests to others. To an unknown degree,
these sellers have a visceral feeling that the inventory should be
"theirs" because they supplied it; they thus become unwilling to
see a secured party with a floating lien have superior rights to
"their" goods. These creditors apparently believe (or at least
hope) that, in the event of a bankruptcy, they will receive a de-
cent percentage of the amounts due to them. This expectation
has been reinforced by some trade creditors who experienced
bankruptcies of customers and received substantial sums from
the proceedings. 62 These creditors have a reasoned belief that
some, or even much, of the value represented by the inventory
will be available to them in the event of their debtor's insolvency.
Moreover, these creditors may value their reclamation rights,
which an inventory security interest would cut off.63
Despite the risk of becoming an unsecured creditor in their
common debtor's bankruptcy, trade creditors prefer a credit sale
to not selling. Faced with inventory on hand and the choice of
making no sales or selling on an unsecured basis to people who
represent risk, the trade creditors will choose to sell. Sale with a
hope of some payment is better than no sale at all, especially
when the seller is overstocked or incurs high fixed costs for
under-utilized production capacity.
These trade creditors protect themselves against their
debtor's possible insolvency by coordinating payment and ship-
ping cycles. When these trade creditors detect signs of customer
distress, they will take steps, short of cutting off all sales, to pro-
tect themselves. To minimize exposure to their debtor's insol-
vency, trade creditors may shorten the credit term, ship less, and
above all, receive payment for any previous shipment before
making the next shipment. Again, they rely on their basic rule-
a sale with hopes of payment is better than no sale at all.
These actions by trade creditors may not be irrational. The
trade creditors do not see themselves as producers selling in per-
fect markets. Instead, they act in the belief that further produc-
62. In the recent Federated-Allied bankruptcy, trade creditors were split
into three classes, the top two classes being paid 100% principal plus interest,
and the third being paid 67% of principal. Federated Has Better Quarter Per-
formance, DAiLY NEws REcoRn, June 19, 1991, at 2. These numbers are unu-
sual, but they occur often enough to provide a rational basis for the described set
of creditor expectations.
63. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 546, 11 U.S.C.
§ 546 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); U.C.C. '§ 2-702 (giving the seller the right to re-
claim goods delivered within 10 days of the reclamation demand, but providing
under § 2-702(3) that the seller loses this right if the buyer has transferred the
goods to a good-faith purchaser for value, including a secured creditor).
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tion would still be on the descending part of the marginal cost
curve. They could reasonably see sales made to buyers with
doubtful finances as incremental sales to which the seller would
attribute only its direct (or marginal) costs. As a result, the sale
would generate a greater than normal profit for which the seller
would be willing to incur greater than normal risk. Moreover,
trade creditors may self-insure against default more easily than
financers. A trade creditor's markup (i.e., gross margin based on
the sale price less the cost of goods sold) often exceeds a fi-
nancer's yield (i.e., the interest rate earned less the cost of
money). This difference, to the extent it exists, reflects, in part,
varying degrees of risk. Yet, after the same number of successful
shipping and payment cycles, a trade creditor will build a larger
"cushion" to offset a buyer's default than will a financer.
Trade creditors would view the debtor's use of inventory as
security as a public statement of the debtor's financial distress,
particularly if the debtor had not previously done so. 6 4 In addi-
tion to the obvious probability of financial distress, the pledge of
the inventory makes the seller's remedies on buyer's insolvency
ineffective. Without a filing system, various creditors must mon-
itor their common debtor or retain an independent service com-
pany to monitor the debtor on their behalf. Yet, the debtor could
enter a private deal with one or more of its creditors granting a
security interest in its tangible assets. 65 Filing, however, elimi-
nates the fear of private deals between a debtor and one or more,
but not all, of its suppliers, by requiring publicity as a condition
of effectiveness. Monitoring public files is a much easier (and
cheaper) task for an organization working on behalf of the trade
creditors than monitoring the debtor. For this trade pattern, fil-
ing and its attendant publicity has obvious informational effi-
ciency advantages over a legal system that gives priority to a
creditor, but does not require the creditor to publicize its priority
rights.
64. The fact that the debtor has pledged its inventory is not always a nega-
tive signal. It is possible that the debtor is doing well enough that it is undergo-
ing some type of a credit crunch. It is possible that the debtor needs all the
capital it can raise in order to expand its business. The trade creditors are well
positioned to understand which of the contradictory meanings that can be given
to the debtor's pledging its inventory is correct.
65. The circumstances here resemble the difficulties a cartel has in main-
taining its cohesion. See D.K. Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 AM. EcoN. REV. 835,
843 (1976) (theorizing that a cartel is unstable, though not necessarily doomed,
because it cannot control outside forces or cheating).
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Whether this pattern exists frequently enough such that the
savings resulting from the filing system outweigh the costs to
those for whom filing is either unnecessary or potentially danger-
ous cannot be answered without some idea of both the frequency
and the costs of each of the variables. We simply do not know
how many trades and creditors engage in this type of financing.
The frequency with which it appeared in conversations with
knowledgeable people suggests that this pattern is not the result
of a few commercial eccentrics. In the absence of data concerning
this trade pattern, a certain caution concerning radical changes
in the information generated by Article 9's filing system would be
appropriate.
These various credit and trade practices strongly suggest the
importance of asset-based lending to the economy and weakly
suggest a connection between filing and asset-based lending for
both secured and some unsecured creditors. If asset-based lend-
ing does represent a noticeable portion of industrial and commer-
cial financing, and if filing does matter to this industry, then
filing is not at all a foolish idea.
C. A THEoRETicAL JUSTIFICATION OF NoN-STRICTLY
HiERAcmcAL CAPrrAL STRuCTUREs AND THE
CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF FILING
The case for filing is thus modestly favorable. There re-
mains, however, one nagging doubt: do these structures that
benefit from filing result from existing legal arrangements, or
would debtors and creditors prefer these structures even under a
legal regime that did not so vigorously encourage asset-based
lending? The existence of a substantial finance industry that de-
pends significantly on assets rather than on the debtor as the
basis to make loans does not in itself demonstrate the wisdom of
a statutory scheme that facilitates the industry's existence. The
industry could merely reflect existing law, so that debtors and
creditors would arrange their affairs consistently with finance
theory if the background law were changed. Asset-based financ-
ing would diminish sharply. What is needed is a theory to sup-
port the belief that the current statutory arrangement reflects
desires of debtors and creditors, much in the same way that stan-
dard finance theory explains why debtors and creditors desire
strictly hierarchical capital structures. Two different proposi-
tions tend to dispute the claim that observable financial struc-
tures are primarily artifacts of existing law. One concerns
creditor differences, and the other revisits agency theory itself.
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1. Creditor Differences
Professor Alan Schwartz's A Theory of Loan Priorities66 is
grounded in finance theory, which has explored, during the past
twenty years, various ways that imperfections in the real world
create opportunities for gain that do not exist in theoretically
perfect markets. One of the major headings for these inquiries
has been the existence of asymmetric information.67 Yet, one im-
perfection has remained virtually untouched-the assumption
that creditors differ among themselves simply has not been part
of the fabric of this discourse. To the extent that creditors differ
from one another, these actual creditors will not conform their
behavior to the simplifying assumption of agency theory-that
all creditors will act in similar fashion as rational persons with
similar information. 68
One type of creditor differentiation relevant to asset-based
lending is specialization in types of collateral. As a factual mat-
ter, the extent of this type of specialization is unknown. Anecdo-
tal support, however, goes back to Dean Scott's article nearly ten
years ago, which reported a high degree of specialization among
secured creditors. 69 Asset-based lending allows creditors to
profit from special capacities to monitor specific types of collat-
eral, from special capacities to realize on the value of collateral,
or from both. The growth of asset-based lending since Dean
Scott published his article suggests that the degree of specializa-
tion may have increased.70
66. Schwartz, supra note 2.
67. See Harris & Raviv, supra note 5, at 306.
68. One fundamental assumption in the Modigliani-Miller model is that
"[clapital markets are perfect. Information is costless and readily available to
all investors. There are no transaction costs and all securities are infinitely di-
visible. Investors are assumed to be rational and behave accordingly." VAN
HORNE, supra note 5, at 272.
On at least one occasion, an attempt was made to introduce creditor differ-
entiation into the theoretical debate concerning secured transactions. See
James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37
VAND. L. REV. 473, 492-94 (1984) (discussing the advantages of granting security
among creditors with differential risk aversion). That attempt was beaten back
by Alan Schwartz in his responding article. Alan Schwartz, The Continuing
Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1065-66 (1984) (rejecting White's
argument for failing to demonstrate that banks lend to the least risky pool of
debtors).
69. Scott, supra note 7, at 943-52.
70. The CFA reports that its members had outstanding in 1985, the last
year included in Dean Scott's research, $57.740 trillion in loans. By 1993, the
comparable number was $102.084 trillion. Although inflation would account for
some of this difference, the growth in the market for CFA member loans has to
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Another significant creditor difference is suggested by the
new literature on asset securitization. Despite the cost, compa-
nies create these deals to take advantage of the imperfections in
the actual credit markets. The difference between these actual
creditors and the model creditor can be seen most sharply in
what Steven L. Schwarcz has called the alchemy of securitiza-
tion.7 1 By this, Schwarcz means that if streams of payments are
divided to match creditor preferences, then the sum of the value
of these different pieces can exceed the value of the undivided
asset, even after taking into account the expenses incurred in
splitting the asset. In these instances, asset securitization oc-
curs because creditors differ systematically in their
preferences. 72
account for a significant amount of the difference. COMMERcmIL FINANcE Associ-
ATiON, supra note 15, at tbl. 1.
71. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 133, 134 (1994); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater
Than the Whole: How Securitization of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize
Structured Finance and Open the Capital Markets to Middle Market Companies,
1993 CoLuM. Bus. L. Rlv. 139, 152-60 (arguing, as its title suggests, that credi-
tors who divide their assets consisting of rights to payment into pieces can, in
some circumstances, create assets whose total value exceeds the value of the
undivided assets).
72. There are many reasons for the differences in creditor preferences. Let
me take, by way of example, one difference that asset securitization values. The
law limits some financial institutions to buying only AAA/aaa securities. That
restriction creates a level of demand for these securities that is higher than that
which would exist in the absence of investment restrictions. The market re-
sponds by manufacturing more AAA/aaa securities to meet this artificial de-
mand. If we abolished these restrictions, the lower demand for AAA/aaa
securities would not support the current level of legal, accounting, and financial
activity required to manufacture these additional AAA/aaa securities.
This one example supports two opposite alternatives:
1. Abolish the investment restrictions and let the unrestricted market do its
work and conform its behavior more nearly to a perfect-market model. This sug-
gestion proposes that whatever benefits we as a society gain by restrictions on
investment activities by some major actors are not worth the costs.
2. Alternatively, we could say that the restrictions serve other valid social
policies and that these policies, although not easily monetized, are worth more
than the now identified costs of an investment restriction. The investment re-
strictions apply often to capital market actors such as insurance companies or
trust funds, both of which signal a high likelihood of risk aversity rather than
risk neutrality. Demanding that these institutions pursue investment strate-
gies consistent with their reasons for existing within the society does not appear
a priori foolish.
Whether these restrictions are justified or not is well beyond the scope of
this Article. For the purposes of this Article all that needs to be established is
that in currently existing markets, these restrictions do exist, and to the extent
they exist they prevent actual investors from acting as the creditors described in
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The loan documentation that top-tier banks use strongly
suggests that creditors differ in ways that matter to debtors. 73
In recent years, when very large financial institutions or consor-
tiums of very large financial institutions have provided credit in
the billion dollar and up range, the documentation for these
loans has not contained the sorts of covenants that financial eco-
nomics would lead us to expect. 74 This relative lack of covenants
becomes all the more puzzling because these credit arrange-
ments reflect commitments by financial institutions to make
available large amounts of credit to debtors without receiving in
return the network of promises that would bind the borrowers to
only a limited range of activities. The credit commitments con-
tained covenants of varying strength, though even the most
strongly covenanted agreement had restrictions perhaps less
binding than conventional finance theory would lead us to ex-
pect. 75 This difference between the behavior that finance theory
finance theory. Seen this way, asset securitization may turn out to be no more
than a mechanism to reduce the social costs created by these restrictions.
73. During the summer of 1994, I was privileged to look at typical loan
agreements entered into by a self-described "top-tier" bank. I understand the
term to include those banks whose business it is to make nine- and ten-digit
loans and create equal-sized credit facilities for major business enterprises. Ob-
viously the top-tier banks also perform the ordinary lending to ordinary-sized
debtors, so the label is more nearly one describing a function rather than a
unique category. Because of confidentiality restrictions, I can name neither the
bank nor the borrowers.
74. To the extent that covenants are absent, the borrowers are free to en-
gage in risk-altering behavior without fear of sanctions from the lenders during
the life of the loan. The absence of covenants also diminishes the lenders' incen-
tives to monitor the debtor during the life of the loan. A monitoring lender that
discovered a displeasing course of action would have, in the absence of a
breached covenant, no leverage to influence the debtor's behavior. If monitoring
can serve no purpose, it is unlikely to occur with the same vigor one expects to
see in heavily covenanted loans.
75. Three agreements represent the two extremes and the mid-point of the
set of documents. One of them, where the borrower is an extremely solvent ma-
jor American corporation, has no affirmative or negative covenants concerning
the company's business activities during the life of the credit facility. The mid-
point documentation does contain some covenants, but their restrictive effect is
extremely limited. The primary restriction, limiting the company's freedom to
enter into secured loans and sales and lease-backs to a stated percent of the
company's tangible assets, resembles in form covenants described as typical.
Given the extraordinary value of this company's tangible assets, the restriction,
as a practical matter, will permit the company very substantial freedom of
action.
The most restrictive set of covenants belongs to a multi-billion dollar credit
facility for a tangible asset-intensive business. These covenants occupy about 20
pages of the Credit Agreement, and they appear to limit the borrower's activity
much as finance theory suggests would be the case. They start with a blunt no-
risk alteration covenant. The borrower agrees not to undertake any business
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predicts and the actual behavior of debtors and creditors sug-
gests the incompleteness of the finance theory account.
Compared to the variation in the strength of the covenants,
far less variation existed in the language concerning the credi-
tor's right to transfer the credit facility, either by assignment in
whole or in part, or by sale of participations. 76 Every credit
agreement severely restricted the right of the creditor to transfer
the credit facility. In each case, the lender retained the right to
transfer the loan only to its wholly-owned subsidiaries, and in
most cases to a Federal Reserve Bank for discount. Otherwise,
the lender could transfer the notes only with the prior affirma-
tive consent of the borrower.77 The most heavily covenanted
which would change the general nature of the business engaged in by the bor-
rower. There follow a series of financial covenants dealing with ratios that must
be maintained between income and the fixed charges against that income. The
ordinary restrictions on liens then appear, along with limitations on dividends
and other payments by thfe borrower.
Though these covenants have the form of covenants designed to limit risk
alteration, even the bank's general counsel described the documents as only
mildly restricting the debtor actions. Close examination of the covenants tended
to confirm this characterization. For example, the borrower is given virtually
unlimited power to use secured transactions to extend its current business by
acquiring its types of tangible assets. The limitation on incurring unsecured
debt would permit the creation of unsecured debt in an amount of approximately
10% of the loan created by the credit agreement. (Remember this is a multi-
billion dollar loan.) The ratios the company promises to maintain between in-
come and fixed charges, although somewhat restrictive, would not impair the
debtor's freedom of action so long as it remained only modestly profitable. Even
the restriction on the change of the general nature of the business engaged in by
the borrower speaks in terms ofjudging the general nature of the business on a
consolidated basis rather than on the basis of each division's separate endeav-
ors. Within the constraints of this loan agreement, a debtor intent on risk sub-
stitution would nonetheless be able to inflict significant fiscal injury on its
lender.
76. Current bank practice concerning loans includes assigning a loan, either
in whole or in part, or selling participations. Actual transactions can blur the
distinction between these two methods banks have of turning the future income
streams that the loans represent into current funds. When a loan is assigned,
the assignee takes over in all respects in performing the functions of the lender.
When a loan is participated, the originating bank sells fractional interests in
rights to receive the payments made on the loan, but the originating bank does
maintain the banking relationship with the customer. The difference for the
debtor between assignment and participation is that in the event the loan terms
need renegotiation (i.e., if the loan has been assigned), the debtor must work
with the assignee rather than the original bank, if the loan has been partici-
pated, however, the original bank still provides the banking relationship. This
difference between assignment and participation is diminished, however, if the
participation agreement provides (as it often does) that the lead bank cannot act
to alter the terms of the original loan without the consent of the participants.
77. These restrictions are reinforced by a further term that limits the bene-
fit of the terms and provisions of the credit agreement to the original banks, the
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credit facility also required the lender to obtain the borrower's
prior written consent before selling a participation or assigning
the loan, but the agreement added "which consent shall not be
unreasonably withheld." Although those words do not appear in
the less heavily covenanted loan agreements, the lender nonethe-
less agrees that it will retain "the sole right and responsibility to
enforce the obligations of the Borrower hereunder including,
without limitation, the right to approve any amendment, modifi-
cation or waiver of any provision" of the credit facility if it enters
into participations of the loan.
The limitations on transferring the loan by the creditors tells
a story deserving our attention. Where creditor bargaining
power created the credit facility with the most restrictive cove-
nants, the restrictions on creditor transfer of the facility in whole
or in part were still almost as substantial as those in the other
credit agreements. This suggests that debtors consider restric-
tions on transfer an important negotiating point, an impression
which the general counsel of the bank confirmed. These restric-
tions indicate that even top tier debtors-debtors extremely un-
likely to default-will insist on the right to control who will be
their creditors. From the debtor's point of view, all creditors do
not look alike when the need to readjust terms of the ongoing
lending relationship arise. Yet, one of the simplifying assump-
tions in the finance theory critique of filing is a uniformity of
creditors. To the extent that uniformity is an assumption not
confirmed by fact, the domain of the theoretical structure de-
pending on that assumption is also limited.
If actual creditors do not behave in the same way as their
counterparts in the financial economics models, then that differ-
ence helps to explain why the extraordinary outpouring of law
review articles applying pieces of financial economics to ques-
tions concerning secured transactions 78 has had little effect on
Federal Reserve Banks, or to those assignees to which the borrower has given its
express consent.
78. An authoritative listing of this literature appears as footnote 23 to the
Permanent Editorial Board's Article 9 Report and includes: Buckley, supra note
51; Thomas H. Jackson & Alan Schwartz, Vacuum of Fact or Vacuous Theory: A
Reply to Professor Kripke, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 987 (1985); Homer Kripke, Law
and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a
Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. P-. L. Rav. 929 (1985); Schwartz, supra note 68;
Schwartz, supra note 22; Scott, supra note 7; Shupack, supra note 22; and
White, supra note 68. PEB REPORT, supra note 12, at 8 n.23.
Other notable contributions to this literature include Barry E. Adler, An
Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 73
(1993); Richard L. Barnes, The Efficiency Justification for Secured Transactions:
[Vol. 79:787812
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statutory reform. Those close to the market are acutely aware of
the importance of differences among creditors. For them, the
analysis and prescriptions based on uniform creditor behavior
rings false, and is thus disregarded.
2. Variations on Agency-Cost Theory
Starting from agency-cost assumptions, a story can be told in
mirror image to the story that has become part of the conven-
tional account of secured lending. If we view the creditor as the
self-interested actor and the debtor as the reacting party, then
the creditor's only concern will be payment in full. The creditor
has no interest in seeing the debtor do more than meet its obliga-
tions to the creditor. The creditor will restrict the debtor from
accepting projects that increase the possibility of loss as a conse-
quence of the proposed change in the joint enterprise's activity.79
Foxes with Soxes and Other Fanciful Stuff, 42 KA. L. Rav. 13 (1993); James W.
Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and
the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REv. 27 (1991); Carl-
son, supra note 22; Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and
Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests,
Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 645 (1992); and George G.
Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 225 (1992).
79. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Hands-Tying Contracts:
Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANmzATIOx 628, 649-50 (1992). According to Hansmann and Kraakman:
There is a much broader class of situations that give rise to the same
basic problem-namely, how much control over a project to give to a
party who participates disproportionately in losses as opposed to gains.
An important example from this broader class is the choice between se-
cured and unsecured debt.
Id. Unsecured creditors often insist on stringent loan covenants, and secured
creditors often have both security and loan covenants that give them an "effec-
tive veto over almost any aspect of the borrower's business." Id. (citing Scott,
supra note 7, at 925-29). The Hansmann and Kraakman article further explains
that
[t~his type of control has the often-noted advantage of preventing the
borrower from opportunistically substituting riskier lines of business
for safer ones at the lender's expense. But, at the same time, it can
induce the inverse problem. Since a lender participates less in the
firm's upside gains than in its downside losses, she has an incentive to
be excessively conservative in permitting the borrower to enter new,
jointly profitable lines of business. Thus secured or covenanted debt
comes at a potential cost. Presumably this helps explain why un-
secured debt is often issued even by firms that have assets that could be
pledged as security. In effect, secured or heavily covenanted debt func-
tions as investment without hands-tying while long-term debt that is
free of such restrictions ties the lender's hands by permitting the debtor
to continue, expand, or alter its projects without the lender's consent.
Id. at 649-50 (citations omitted).
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The creditor, then, functions as a drag upon the activities of the
joint enterprise, opposing actions that would benefit the debtor-
creditor enterprise taken as a whole, but not the creditor
exclusively.
This account suggests a direct benefit that asset-based lend-
ing can give to debtors. A creditor who looks primarily to certain
of the debtor's pledged assets for assurance that the loan will be
repaid has little incentive to control the debtor. If filing facili-
tates the creation of asset-based lending, then filing serves as a
mechanism to allow debtors and creditors to control the agency
costs that result from creditors' self-protective actions. To the ex-
tent that segregation of newly-acquired assets is necessary for
debtor independence, then something like the current statute's
superpriority for PMSIs begins to make sense. Thus, the agency-
cost account that suggests the irrelevance of filing can be used in
mirror image to suggest its necessity.
If these theoretical points have any validity at all, they sug-
gest reasons to believe that asset-based financing is not solely an
artifact of existing law, but instead a response by debtors and
creditors to complications actual markets create. To the extent
that existing theory does not allow for these complications, the
theory and the analysis following from it are incomplete.
3. Social Theory and Social Fact
Asset-based financing is part of a larger set of intercon-
nected financial practices. Isolating one financial practice for
discussion risks missing the social roles that the entire set of fi-
nancial practices performs. Without proper data, it is impossible
to do more than merely suggest one possible connection between
the credit practices represented by asset-based lending and soci-
ety as a whole.
Asset-based financing is predominantly an American and
English phenomenon. European credit structures, though they
have security devices, function more nearly as finance theory de-
scribes preferred debtor-creditor structures. In caricature, Euro-
pean financial structures have been described as top-down.
Major financial institutions provide mega-loans to giant enter-
prises, which in turn finance the smaller components of their
businesses. That pattern conforms to the picture of creditors
who, after performing due diligence on prospective debtors, make
loans on the worth of an enterprise as a whole, rather than on
the credit-worthiness of a specific asset.
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Commercial finance companies provide what can be de-
scribed, in caricature, as bottom-up financing, and virtually do
not exist in European economies. It is far beyond the scope of
this Article to argue, much less plausibly demonstrate, that some
connection exists between bottom-up financing in this country
and some of the observed flexibility of the American economy.
We know just enough to make plausible the idea that some con-
nection exists between the lending practices we call asset-based
lending and the performance of the overall economy. To the ex-
tent that a connection does exist, so radical a change in the ex-
isting structure as the abolition of filing should be considered
with only the greatest of caution.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether filing is a good idea has to be empir-
ical. The data that would answer that question are not directly
obtainable, so the best we can do is offer reasons to believe what
the data would show if those data existed. The case against fil-
ing, built on the premise that the information the filings gener-
ate is already known to the relevant creditors, has both a sound
theoretical basis and also significant data to support it.
This Article has made two basic arguments in support of fil-
ing. A noticeable number of creditors engage in lending in which
the asset rather than the debtor is central to the transactions,
and filing facilitates this type of lending. In addition, this type of
lending constitutes a non-trivial part of the current American
economy. In its second argument, this Article has suggested that
the empirical points standing by themselves could prove nothing
about the worth to the economy of this type of transaction. Their
existence could easily be explained as an artifact of existing legal
structures. In answer to that point, this Article has suggested
reasons to believe that the standard proposed by finance theory
is incomplete. The areas in which finance theory does not ex-
plain creditor behavior also provide the strongest theoretical ba-
sis to believe that the lending practices we call asset-based
lending can be defended on theoretical, as well as practical,
grounds.
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